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横山彰（中央大学）

第80回慶應EU研究会
「連邦主義と多中心主義の再考察」
Reconsideration of Federalism and Polycentrism

1. はじめに

“Federalism is often used as a synonym for decentralization and at the same time is often thought to be a way of achieving decentralization democratically” (Wagner, 2005:184).

Federalism, Decentralization, (Dis)Integration, Polycentrism の意味内容の異同と相互関係についての考察が、先行研究では必ずしも十分になされていない。連邦主義 (Federalism) と多中心主義 (Polycentrism) との関係あるいは、連邦主義に基づく政治システムである連邦制 (Federalism) と多中心主義に基づく政治システムである多中心制 (Polycentric political system = Polycentricity) との関係を中心に考察する。

【先行研究の中での位置づけ】

Fiscal Federalism

Musgrave (1956), Oates (1972, 1999), Buchanan and Musgrave (1999)

Political (dis)integration

Buchanan (1995/96), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Ruta (2005)

Secession

Buchanan and Faith (1987), Sunstein (1991), McGee (1992)

American Federalism

Ostrom (1991), Wood (2011), LaCroix (2010, 2011), Safty (2012), Duthu (2013)

Polycentrism (Polycentricity, Polycentric political system)

Ostrom, Tiebou and Warren (1961), Ostrom (1972, 1991), Wagner (2005), McGinnis and Ostorm (2011)

【連邦主義の政治経済学的考察】

財政連邦主義（効率基準に基づく財政機能の最適配分としての連邦主義）

立憲連邦主義（Leviathan government の統制手段としての連邦主義）

【多中心主義の政治経済学的考察】

多中心性 (polycentricity) という概念は、Vincent Ostrom によって展開されてきた (Ostrom, Tiebou and Warren, 1961; Ostrom 1972, 1991)。多中心性 (polycentricity) という

言葉は、Ostrom (1972: 6) によると Polanyi (1951) が最初に用いた。

“We [the authors] identified a polycentric political system as having many centers of decision making which were formally independent of each other” (Ostrom, 1972: 1). “[P]olycentricity conveys more than just federalism as it typically is understood. A federal system may consist only of a sequence of neatly nested jurisdictions at the local, state or provincial, and national levels, but a polycentric system also includes crosscutting jurisdictions specializing in particular policy matters, such as an agency managing a river basin that cuts across state lines. In addition, private corporations, voluntary associations, and community-based organizations play critical supporting roles in a polycentric system of governance, even if they have not been assigned public roles in an official manner” (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011: 15) .

2. Federalism, Decentralization, and (Dis)Integration

(1) Federalism from the bottom up or the top down?



Figure 1. A constitutional reform schema

Source: Buchanan (1995/96: 266)

(2) Models of Political (Dis)Integration

Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Ruta (2005)

$$\text{Max. } u = y - t + g(1 - as) \quad \text{subject to } st = K.$$

$$s^* = [K/(ga)]^{1/2}$$

g is the public good, s is the size of the country and a is a positive parameter that measures the costs of the size. The public good has a fixed cost K that is financed by the poll tax and the per capita tax rate, t , is given by K/s , where $st = K$.

(3) The literature seldom differentiates between the **top down** and **bottom up** approaches, nor does it differentiate between **design** and **reform**, when considering the relationships among federalism, decentralization, and political (dis)integration. The difference between the **coercive** and **voluntary** movements has also gained little recognition.

(4) 意味内容の異同

Federalism means a system of federal government in which states and other local governments reserve the powers not delegated to the federal government by agreeing to parcel out authority from the bottom up.

Decentralization only denotes the top down transfer of power from governments at a higher level to governments at a lower level in a hierarchical structure.

Political (dis)integration shows change in both the configuration and the governing powers of localities, states, and countries.

3. Federalism and Polycentrism

(1) 連邦制を巡る Wood (2011) と LaCroix (2011) の議論

Wood's (2011: 724) argument for "federalism from the bottom up" is as follows: "Given the Americans' long experience with **parceling [out] power from the bottom** ..., forming the Articles of Confederation posed no great theoretical problems. Thirteen independent and sovereign states came together to form **a treaty that created a 'firm league of friendship,'** [Articles of Confederation Art III] a collectivity not all that different from the present-day European Union."

LaCroix (2011: 733) argues against Wood's assertion that: "From a disconnected and sometimes ambiguous set of arguments about divided sovereignty in politics, American colonists and early republicans fashioned a new architecture of legal and constitutional authority built on a subject-matter division of governmental power. In contrast to earlier systems ... of **polycentric government**, the federalism of the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century United States was specifically designed to avoid the ancient problem of *imperium in imperio*, or **dominion within a dominion**, ... The significant innovation of the American federal idea was to authorize **the division of sovereignty** and to create viable categories that could contain multiple sources of governmental power within one overarching system."

(2) American Indian tribes の存在

Wood (2011) criticizes LaCroix's argument "that **the Iroquois Confederacy** ---also known as the Iroquois League or the Six Nations--- **provided the inspiration for British American efforts at union**" in an endnote (LaCroix, 2010: 229, n.20). The significant aspect in considering the difference between polycentrism and federalism is not the "Iroquois influence" thesis, but the existence of the Iroquois Confederacy in the 1750s, despite the problem of dominion within a dominion. As often noted, American Indian tribes now exist as "domestic dependent nations" within the United States, with powers of self-government that operate within their territories (Duthu, 2013).

"American Indian tribes often have multiple identities. First and foremost they are 'domestic

dependent nations' with their own constitutions and governing bodies. But many Indian tribes also have a number of separate corporate identities" (Safty, 2012: 1593).

(3) 上記の議論から示唆される連邦制（主義）と多中心制（主義）の異同

“[T]he difference between federalism and polycentricity is similar to the difference between a structure of government and the processes through which governmental entities operate within that structure. **Federalism is the architecture or design of a system to solve the problem of dominion within a dominion; polycentricity is a spontaneous process characterized by dominion within a dominion.** Polycentricity generates dynamic changes through the interaction between multiple centers of decision making that are formally independent of one another. The reason why the interaction occurs is the possibility of mutual gain through obtaining agreement among participants. **Furthermore, federalism has coordinated and intentional divisions of sovereignty. In contrast, polycentricity does not have such intended divisions of sovereignty but rather accepts and operates within the overlapping of sovereignty and territory**” (Wagner and Yokoyama, 2014: 19).

(4) EU への示唆

Kanbur and Keen (1993), Eichenberger (1994), Frey and Eichenberger (1996), Mueller (1997), Zodrow (2003), Piattoni. (2010), van Zeben (2013)

⇒⇒ 競争と協調、水平的租税競争と垂直的租税競争、Multi-level Governance、FOCJ (Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions)

4. 価値判断：帰結主義と非帰結主義

(1) Competitive Federalism vs. Cartel Federalism

Eusepi and Wagner (2010), Yokoyama (2012b), Wagner and Yokoyama (2014)

帰結の比較：何らかの価値判断に基づき、連邦制というシステム設計（政策手段）の帰結は非連邦制のシステム設計（政策手段）の帰結よりも良いかどうか比較する。⇒⇒ 資料 2

非帰結の比較：システム設計（政策手段）そのものの比較 ⇒⇒ Suzumura (1999)

帰結主義： $W\{F(X, Z), R(X_{-1})\}$

非帰結主義： $W\{X, H^{-1}(X)\}$

総合主義： $W\{X, H^{-1}(X), F(X, Z), R(X_{-1})\}$

期待帰結 $F(X, Z)$ = 政策環境 Z のもとで政策手段 X によって実現されると期待される
帰結（社会状態）

関数 $F(\cdot)$ = 政策理論

過去の現実帰結 $R(X_{-1})$ = 過去に政策手段 X を執行した結果として出現した現実帰結（社

会状態)

$H^{-1}(X)$ = 政策手段 X の選び方や導出手続

$W(\cdot)$ = 個人の利得 (社会的厚生関数)

(2) 政策環境と政策理論

外部環境 Z_i の認識は現実には個人 i ($i=1, 2, \dots, n$) によって差があり、利得ないし社会的厚生関数 $W_i(\cdot)$ も個人 i によって異なり、政策理論 $F_g(\cdot)$ も、一般の個人ではなく専門知識を獲得した個人すなわち専門家 g ($g=1, 2, \dots, d$) によって提示され相互に異なるならば、個人 i の帰結主義的評価は、この個人が選択する政策理論 $F_{i[g]}(\cdot)$ に左右された

$$W_i\{F_{i[g]}(X, Z_i), R(X, I)\}$$

に基づいてなされる。⇒⇒ Yokoyama (2012a)

“While expressed policy differences might reflect preferences as primitive conditions, they also might reflect quasi-scientific beliefs about reality. In this latter case, discussion can lead to changes in beliefs and preferences, not as a reflection of brainwashing but as a reflection of how discussion among equals might generate knowledge” (Wagner and Yokoyama, 2014: 22).

5. 結論

“Federalism is the architecture or design of a system, while polycentricity denotes a spontaneously ordered process in which many people participate but which no single person plans or controls. Polycentricity is not designed; federalism is. Federalism can be formed either from the top down or from the bottom up. In contrast, polycentricity is a natural form of societal existence, ... Polycentric arrangements operate best when participants proceed on equal-footing to secure mutual gain by getting agreement and resolving conflict. The distinction between bottom up and top down, however, is irrelevant for polycentrism because it is a spontaneously ordered arrangement and not an artificially created system of governments. Federalism is an artificial political system which intentionally solves for political externalities of policy. In contrast, polycentricity internalizes political externalities of policy by voluntary agreement, and generates a network externality. ...

Finally, federalism is justified on the basis of the consequentialism, while polycentricity is supported by non-consequentialism rather than consequentialism. Policy is defined as people’s efforts to realize a better society. How, then, can we judge what constitutes a better society? This value judgment becomes important. ... Consequently, individual visions of a “better society” determine the constitutional rule of governance” (Wagner and Yokoyama, 2014: 23-25).

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